Abstract: Key management for anonymous communication in mobile ad hoc networks is a critical but unsolved problem. Many current anonymous mobile ad hoc routing protocols assume that mobile users share pairwise secrets before they start an anonymous communication session. This assumption is impractical for many ad hoc scenarios where pairwise shared keys are difficult to be set up in advance. Public-key based solution, such as identity-based cryptographic solutions have been proposed for anonymous communications. However, these approaches assume that a centralised Trust Authority (TA) is in charge of the private key generation. Thus, the anonymous communications are not anonymous to the TA. To solve the above mentioned problems, we present pairing-based encryption/decryption, key exchange, blind certificate and revocation solutions for anonymous communications. Our approach provides the following properties compared to traditional approaches: (1) an Anonymous User's (AU's) identity (i.e. a pseudonym) can be used as his/her public key (i.e. the same as traditional identity-based solution); however, each AU can self-derive his/her private key based on a set of publicly known system parameters and his/her chosen pseudonym (this is different from the traditional identity-based solution); (2) a pair of AUs can derive a shared key based on each other's pseudonym without using interactive key exchanging protocols; (3) an AU can self-choose his/her pseudonym that can be blindly signed by a certificate authority and only the pseudonyms with a verifiable certificate are authorised to participate in the anonymous communications (the certificate can be verified by using a set of publicly known system parameters) and (4) the certificate authority is able to revoke AUs' pseudonym. Due to these properties, our approach reduces key management overhead and is suitable for large-scale and ad hoc anonymous services.
Introduction
In mobile wireless ad hoc network environments, preserving privacy is a difficult task. Due to the broadcasting feature of wireless networks, adversaries can easily eavesdrop all transmitted data when cryptographic protections are not applied. Even though the transmitted data is encrypted, the substrate-layer protocols can still expose the identifiable information of wireless users, such as a unique IP address or MAC address (Huang, 2006) . If both the MAC-layer and network-layer addresses are encrypted in the application layer, each wireless user needs to try all possible keys to decrypt the message in order to discover whether or not he/she is the corresponding receiver. Though this method is desirable for the purpose of anonymity, it will involve a lot cryptographic computational overhead. Thus, an effective addressing and identifying method for anonymous communications is highly desired in mobile ad hoc networks. Thus, in this paper, our research will answer the questions such as "How to establish initial cryptographic parameters between anonymous users? And how effectively can an anonymous user keep track of anonymous communication sessions without compromising the anonymity from both sides?"
The challenge can be illustrated as follows. It is desirable to have an organiser who is in charge of the admission control of the anonymous communication system. To admit an AU, we need to fulfil the following requirements:
1 each AU must rely on a set of publicly know system parameters to self-generate his/her pseudonym (a public key) and then self-derive corresponding private key 2 each AU must rely on the anonymous system organiser to derive a certificate for his/her pseudonym 2 3 however, the organiser cannot disclose the AU's pseudonym and corresponding private key and 4 the AU cannot replicate new pseudonym and corresponding certificates based on his/her pseudonym and the certificate issued by the organiser.
Our contribution: in this paper, we present such a scheme that fulfil the above-mentioned requirements (1)-(4). To achieve our goal, we propose a pairing-based cryptographic solution to construct a Pseudonym-Based Cryptography (PBC). Our approach provides protections to user's identity as well as the basic cryptographic functions, such as encryption and blind signature. In summary, our PBC approaches have the following features.
A pseudonym-based encryption scheme that an AU can self-generate a pseudonym and corresponding private key by utilising a set of publicly known system parameters, which is presented in Section 3. Comparing to traditional identity-based cryptography (Boneh and Franklin, 2003) , our approach does not depend on the TA to generate an AU's private key; in the meantime, it enables the organiser to revoke AUs by changing the publicly known system parameters.
We present a pseudonym-based Zero-round Key Exchange (ZKE) protocol that can be used to share a secret key between any pair of AUs, which is presented in Section 4. Unlike traditional Diffie-Hellman based key exchanging protocol (Menezes et al., 1997) , in our approach, based on each other's pseudonyms, two AUs do not need to exchange key components to derive a shared secret. This is because that the key exchanging component has been already embedded in the AU's pseudonym. This approach is also useful to construct the revocation scheme presented in Section 6.
We propose a blind certificate scheme that the organiser can blindly issue certificates to AUs, which is presented in Section 5. A blind certificate (Mao, 1996 ) is a pseudonym signed by the organizer's master key without exposing the pseudonym to the organiser. We combine the BLS (Boneh et al., 2001 ) and blind signature scheme (Boldyreva, 2003) to generate the blink certificate for a pseudonym. An AU can be verified if he possesses a valid blind certificate, that is, only the pseudonym with a verifiable certificate can be used to generate ciphertexts or verify signatures. Note that our approach is different from the traditional group signature schemes where the signature for a message is originated from an anonymous group. We propose a solution for the authorisations to encryption keys and verification keys for a pair of entities.
In Section 6, we propose a pseudonym revocation scheme that the organiser is able to revoke one or multiple pseudonyms. The revocation is either group-based (i.e. by changing the system parameters to revoke a group of AUs) or individual-based (i.e. by building a revocation list to revoke one AU).
In the following sections, we propose a Pseudonym-Based Cryptographic (PBC) solution for anonymous communication systems. Our solution is very useful in wireless broadcasting environments that2 System and models
Anonymous communications in wireless networks
Several wireless anonymous communications were recently proposed, for examples, Kong and Hong (2003) , Boukerche et al. (2004) , Zhu et al. Zhang et al. (2005) and Seys and Preneel (2006) . Current anonymity researches in wireless networks mainly focus on two directions: unlinkable and unobservable (Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2005) data-delivering (see Figure 1 ) and anonymous routing protocol:
1 Unlinkable and unobservable data-delivering in multi-hop wireless networks: in wireless environments, the adversaries can easily capture transmitted packets. Both packet contents and header fields can reveal the information of packet sources and destinations. Thus, for unlinkable data-delivering, the packet contents should be encrypted and the header fields such as the MAC and network addresses must be hidden; for example, the source and destination addresses are set to broadcasting addresses, that is, all '1' for wireless broadcasting networks. In order to identify the receivers, a one-way trapdoor message (i.e., an encrypted message (Kong and Hong, 2003) ) is associated with the packet and only the desired receivers can open and decrypt the packet. In addition to link the communication participants, the adversaries can monitor the transmitted radio frequencies to deploy traffic analysing attacks in order to disclose the communication participants. To prevent the wireless signals from being intercepted or detected, low probability of interception/low probability of detection communication techniques must be deployed, for example, spread-spectrum modulation, effective power control and directional antennas (Berg et al., 1998) .
2 Anonymous routing: the main goal of the anonymous routing is to prevent the adversaries from learning the packet forwarding paths. On-demand anonymous path establishment has been proposed, that is, a route request is broadcasted hop-by-hop and a route reply is unicasted along the reverse direction of corresponding requesting path. Note that the routing packets are protected by using per-hop encryption. Using this approach, MIX-net based routing were proposed to prevent the attackers from deploying both passive and active attacks to learn the packet delivery paths, for example, Kong and Hong (2003) , routing table-driven anonymous routing, for example, Zhang et al. (2005) and anti-traffic analysis techniques such as dummy traffic (Díaz and Preneel, 2004) , spread spectrum (Berg et al., 1998) and frequency filtering approach (Fu et al., 2005) .
As shown in Figure 1 , researches (1) and (2) are mainly covered in the unshaded area. The cryptography serves as a bridge between the networking activities and the acting subjects involved within the anonymous communications. Pseudonyms can be used to hide the real identities of acting subjects. The majority of the existing key management solutions assume that the identities (or pseudonyms) are independent to the cryptographic keys involved in corresponding anonymous communications. As a result, AUs must rely on an additional key management mechanism (or an additional trust framework) to distribute cryptographic keys. Simplified trust models have been proposed without considering anonymous requirements for the cryptographic keys and the trust relations among cryptographic key holders. For example, in Boukerche et al. (2004) , every AU has others' public keys preinstalled (Kong and Hong, 2003; Seys and Preneel, 2006; Zhu et al., 2004) , a unique pairwise key is shared between each pair of AUs in advance. These assumptions may breach the anonymity of AUs since they do not provide anonymity protection due to the key management. For example, if a Key Distribution Center (KDC) is responsible for the key distribution, the anonymous communications are not blind to the KDC; if traditional PKI is used, the certificate will reveal the key holders' privacy to the issuer (i.e. a certificate authority). However, if the centralised key management is not available, the pairwise key sharing is not a trivial task for AUs. Moreover, the additional key management overhead is substantial for wireless communications. In order to reduce the key management overhead, Zhang et al. (2005) proposed to use identity-based key management approach for anonymous communications.
The identity-based key management has the following two properties:
1 The key management is very simple and efficient, since a mobile user's identity can serve as his/her public key. Note that the mobile user's identity can be broadcasted when the user joins the communication system.
2 A pseudonym can be used as a mobile user's identity. This means that a pseudonym can serve as both the identity and the public key of an anonymous mobile user. Using identity-based solution, the ciphertext sender just simply uses the receivers' pseudonyms as the public key to encrypt the plaintext. Later, the ciphertext receiver is required to contact a trusted third party to derive corresponding decryption key (a private key) in order to decrypt the ciphertext. This approach has one drawback, that is, the anonymous routing is not blind to a trusted third party (i.e. the Private Key Generator (PKG). Within an anonymous communication system, we expect to achieve anonymity for AUs, that is, an AU is unidentifiable by other AUs and the anonymous communication organiser, for example, the PKG. In addition, we expect to achieve administrative abilities such as accountability and admissibility for the anonymous communication system.
Our proposed research focuses on the use of identity-based cryptography and appropriate modifications to achieve both accountability and admissibility of an anonymous communication system (see Figure 1 , the shaded portion of the figure). Our cryptographic solutions have the following capabilities:
1 Accountability: by accountability, we mean that the acting AU's actions are able to be authenticated with respect to his/her digital pseudonym. In other words, the ciphertext can be linked to its originator(s), that is, one or a group of digital pseudonyms. For example, the message authentication code (or a digital signature) of a ciphertext is verifiable from an anonymity set.
2 Admissibility: by admissibility, we mean that the role of an AU or a service provided by an AU is admissible by the system organiser. In other words, the system organiser can authorise as well as revoke the AU.
3 Unidentifiable: the AU is unidentifiable from the anonymity set. To pinpoint an acting subject (the activity and linkability shown in Figure 1 ) is not our research interest and has been already extensively studied in terms of unlinkability and unobservability (see the discussions in above contexts); whereas our research focusses on the identity and linkability (presented in the shaded area in Figure 1 ) due to accountability and admissibility which are discussed in Section 2.2. Pfitzmann and Hansen (2005) defined the anonymity as the state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects, that is, the anonymity set. We also call such an unidentifiable state as the anonymous state. The anonymity set is the set of all possible acting subjects such as human beings, legal persons or computers. An anonymous communication system explored in this paper is thus defined as a networking environment where the acting subjects are in anonymous states, that is, in degrees of non-identifiable states.
The relations among anonymity, pseudonym and identity
In an anonymous communicating system, an identity 3 must uniquely identify an acting subject and it is publicly known. Such an identity is difficult to be realised in the digital world without employing an arbitrative mechanism. Thus, we use the term identity holder instead of identity owner in the rest of this paper.
Pseudonyms are identifiers of subjects and they can help to construct non-identifiable states for subjects. As shown in (1), an identity (a.k.a, a unique public pseudonym) uniquely identifies the subject (either from inheritance such as a DNA sequence or via assignments such as e-mail addresses, social security numbers, etc.).
Subject link ← − →
Identity or public pseudonym link?
Once an identity is assigned to a subject, it is unusual to be changed or transferred to other subjects within a short time period. Thus, we assume that the identity should be bound to a subject with a relatively longer time. One identity may be bound to multiple pseudonyms (they are at least initially hidden) that links to different usages or functions within an anonymous communication session. According to Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (2001) , these pseudonyms must be independent to each other. For anonymity purpose, the linkage between a pseudonym and corresponding identity (or its actions) is only known to the identity/pseudonym holder. Pfitzmann and Hansen (2005) categorised the pseudonyms into five classes based on their linkabilities to subjects:
(a) the person pseudonym links to the subject's identity We note that (c)-(e) are highly related to the communication sessions, that is, the pseudonyms are used to trace one operation or a sequence of actions to one or a pair of communication entities, for example, sequence numbers and session identifiers. For enhanced privacy, these pseudonyms must be encrypted (Syverson et al., 2000) . (a) and (b) usually have longer relationships between the pseudonyms and subjects than other pseudonyms. They are usually used at the beginning of an anonymous communication session in order to set up mutual trust, that is, the operations such as authentications, authorisations, credential exchanges, secret key exchanges and so on. These operations are very critical since they build the foundation to ensure both the security and the privacy of the following communications. In this paper, our research focus on how to use PBC to manage the person-and role-pseudonyms. Using these pseudonyms, we explore the following security functions to set up mutual trust among AUs (i.e. setup cryptographic parameters) and achieve accountability and admissibility within an anonymous communication system: 1 pseudonym-based encryption/decryption algorithms 2 pseudonym-based key exchanging protocol 3 blind certificates for pseudonyms 4 pseudonym revocations.
D. Huang
Our approach is based on the identity-based cryptography, which can be traced back to the IBE firstly proposed by Shamir (1985) . The construction of the IBE scheme has the following assumptions: (a) the user's identity is used as his/her public key. The message sender uses receiver's identity to encrypt the message (b) once receiving the message, the receiver derives the corresponding private key from a trusted third party -the PKG -and decrypts the message (c) the PKG is in charge of the private key generation. A user must derive the private from the PKG in order to decrypt the ciphertext.
In our approach, we modify the assumptions (a)-(c) presented above. In particular, we use pseudonyms instead of using identities and the term PKG is replaced by anonymous communication organiser (organiser for short); we enable the AUs to self-generate the pseudonyms and corresponding private keys without relying on the organiser. Based on the new assumptions and our proposed blind certificates and revocation schemes, we can achieve both accountability and admissibility for the anonymous communication system. The detailed approaches are presented in Sections 3-6.
Attack model
The adversaries can eavesdrop the packets to breach the key privacy, that is, identifying the used encryption keys and signature keys. For example, using traditional RSA scheme, the public key is the pair e, n where e is the encryption exponent and n is the modular; since e and n are publicly known, the adversaries can identify the used public key by evaluating the encryption results from known plaintext, for example, the known packet header fields. This attack is to breach the key privacy. The optimal asymmetric encryption padding (Bellare and Rogaway, 1995; Bellare et al., 2001 ) was proposed to protect the key privacy for RSA-based encryption. Traditional symmetric stream cipher also discourages the key privacy attack (Syverson et al., 2000) . IBE (Boneh and Franklin, 2003) utilises randomly chosen encryption components during the encryption procedure, that is, a randomly chosen encryption assistant point [t]P for each ciphertext (see Section 3, Encrypt algorithm). The anonymity requirements of the cryptographic encryption are:
1 the same plaintext encrypted by the same cryptographic key will generate different ciphertexts and 2 the public encryption key is unidentifiable based on known ciphertexts.
Using IBE scheme (Boneh and Franklin, 2003) , the organiser (i.e. a PKG) is a potential adversary that can breach AUs' privacy since the organiser generates private keys for all AUs. Thus, it is highly desired that the generated private keys are blind to the organiser; however this may compromise the administrative capability of the organiser. In order to achieve both accountability and admissibility, an AU should be authenticated by verifying his/her pseudonym (i.e. a public key) certificate, where the certificate generation procedure is also blind to the organiser. To fulfil such a requirement, the generated certificate is called blind certificate (Mao, 1996) . Thus, the anonymity requirement is the organiser is not able to identify the pseudonym holder by checking the ciphertext, signatures and corresponding pseudonym certificates. The organiser should be able to revoke AUs by revoking their pseudonyms. Chen et al. (2003) proposed an identity-based solution to revoke a pseudonym by using an organiser assigned timer T . The timer T is used as part of the pseudonym and it should be provided by the pseudonym holder at the beginning of an anonymous communication session. Using their approach, since the timer T is assigned by the organiser, the corresponding anonymous communication is not blind to the organiser. In order to protect the AUs' privacy, we require that the revocation scheme should not introduce identifiable tokens and can effectively revoke an AUs without compromising the AUs' privacy.
All our proposed solutions should provide semantic anonymity to fulfil the above described requirements, that is, it must be infeasible for a computationally bounded passive adversaries to derive significant information to identify a subject and his/her pseudonyms and the subject related cryptographic operations.
System set-up
In this section, we present the system parameters to set up our PBC system. Our approaches are based on pairings, see Chapter IX (Blake et al., 2005) . The known mathematical models of pairings -the Weil and Tate pairings -involve fairly complex mathematics. Fortunately, they can be dealt with abstractly, using only the group structure and mapping properties. Many interesting schemes have been built-based purely on abstract bilinear maps.
The major pairing-based construction is the bilinear map. Considering two groups G 1 and G 3 , we denote G 1 using additive notation and G 3 using multiplicative notation. The bilinear mapping can be denote byê : G 1 × G 1 → G 3 and the mapping have three properties:
. This can be restated in the following way. For P , Q, R ∈ G 1 ,ê(P + Q, R) = e(P , R)ê(Q, R) andê(P , Q + R) = e(P , Q)ê(P , R).
Non-degeneracy: ifê(P , Q) = 1 for all Q ∈ G 1 , then P must be the identity element in G 1 .
Computability: the bilinear mapê is efficiently computable.
A set of system parameters, denoted as params, is publicly known to all AUs. There are many ways to publish the params. For example, it can be published on some trusted websites and thus every AU can download it; some publicly well-known trusted party can generate a certificate for the params and thus the certificate can be broadcasted during the anonymous communication and every AU can verify the params. In this paper, the system parameters are represented as:
The detailed explanation of params is given in Table 1 . 
Mapping from addition group G 1 to multiplicative group G 3 n Bit length of plaintext
Public key of the anonymous communication system, s ∈ Z * δ P is only known by the params generator
In traditional IBE scheme (Boneh and Franklin, 2003) , the function H 1 is a random oracle which is used to map an identity from {0, 1} n to a point in G 1 . However in anonymous service, the identity is a pseudonym, which is not necessary to be meaningful. An AU can randomly select a point Q A in the group G 1 as his/her pseudonym. Thus, we remove the H 1 from params. Instead, we introduce another random function H , which maps a point in G 1 and a value in G 3 to a random point in the group G 1 . In the following sections the proposed PBC solutions will utilise the multiplicative properties of parings, the IBE scheme and BLS signature scheme (Boneh et al., 2001 ).
Pseudonym-based encryption

PBE with trusted PKG
To enable an AU to self-generate his/her pseudonym and corresponding private key without relaying on the PKG, we can simply remove the H 1 : {0, 1}
n → G 1 function in the original IBE scheme. In IBE scheme, the hash function H 1 maps an identity ID A to a point Q A = H 1 (ID A ) in group G 1 . As we know, the point P is the generator of group G 1 , that is, any point in group G 1 can be represented as [k ]P , where k ∈ Z δ P . Due to the hash function H 1 , the adversary cannot derive the value k with the known points P and [k ]P , which is equivalent to solving the ECDLP problem (described in Appendix A). If we remove the H 1 operation from the IBE scheme, an AU can randomly select a value k ∈ Z δ P and then compute point [k]P as his/her pseudonym. Based on the publicly known system parameter [s]P , the AU can self-derive the private key [ks]P by simply multiplying the point [s]P with the value k. In this way, the AU can self-generate a valid pseudonym and private key pair
Using above presented modified IBE scheme, the AU can generate pseudonym and private key pairs without restrictions. However, using above approach, the drawback is that the AUs must trust the PKG. Although there is no need to relay on the PKG to generate the private key, the underlying anonymous communications are not blind to the PKG. This is because that the PKG can simply multiply [k]P by s to derive the private key [sk]P .
PBE without trusted PKG
The same as it is specified in IBE scheme, the PBE scheme includes four steps: Setup, Extract, Encryption and Decryption. The PBE scheme is represented as follows:
Setup: system parameters params = G 1 , G 3 ,ê, n, P , Q 0 , δ P , H, H 2 , H 3 , H 4 is published. 4 The description of params is given in Encrypt: to encrypt the plaintext M ∈ {0, 1} n for entity A with pseudonym PD A , perform the following steps:
1 choose a random r ∈ {0, 1} n 2 set t = H 3 (r, M) 3 compute and output the ciphertext:
Decrypt: 
Comparison between PBE and IBE
The PBE scheme is a modified FullIdent scheme of IBE scheme (Boneh and Franklin, 2003) . However, they are fundamentally different. We describe their differences as follows. Firstly, the basic constructions of PBE scheme and IBE scheme are different. In PBE scheme, there is no concept of the PKG. All AUs use a set of publicly known params. In fact, the AUs do not need to rely on the publicly known params to self-generate the public/private key pair. However, in order to enable the revocation ability for the anonymous communication system organiser, all AUs are enforced to generate their private key by using the params. The point Q A is indeed a masked point and the masker is c A . The private key is only known to the user himself. Thus, no one except the AU himself is able to decrypt the ciphertext and discover the real identity. In the IBE scheme, all users rely on the PKG to generate their private keys. Thus, the underlying communications are not blind to the PKG. Secondly, the methods to generate an identity (or a pseudonym) are different. In PBE scheme, since the pseudonym can be a random string, it is not necessary to be meaningful to human beings. Instead, the pseudonyms are only rememberable to computers. In IBE scheme, the user's identity is publicly known and it should be unique and memorisable by humans, such as the user's e-mail address. The conversion from an identity to a point on the curve is one-way, such as the hash function H 1 : {0, 1} n → G 1 in IBE scheme; however, in PBE scheme, we do not require this function.
Thirdly, the PBE scheme is more scalable and flexible in terms of the private key generation. In PBE scheme, the AU computes his/her private key. It is not necessary to contact an online trusted third party to start an anonymous conversation and there is no need to derive a private key from the PKG in order to decrypt a ciphertext. Thus, the PBE scheme is suitable for large-scale anonymous system. Whereas in the IBE scheme for real-time communications, the PKG must be always online in order to generate private keys for all pseudonyms and the private keys must be securely delivered to the AUs.
Finally, the PBE scheme introduces several additional operations: one inverse operation, three point multiplications (i.e. the computations of [k]P , [kk]P and [k −1 −1]P ) and one pairing operation in the Extract algorithm. The compensation is the reduction of one mapping operation (by using H 1 in IBE scheme). In Encryption algorithm, one multiplication operation in G 3 is added. Since the Extract algorithm is only performed for the pseudonym and private key generation, the computational overhead due to one multiplication operation in the Encryption algorithm is not significant.
Security and anonymity analysis of PBE
Here, we analyse the PBE scheme presented in Section 3.2. To see how it works, we demonstrate the correctness of the H 2 operation in the Encrypt algorithm, which is used in the first step of the Decrypt algorithm.
The proposed PBE scheme is based on the FullIdent scheme proposed by Boneh and Franklin (2003) . The FullIdent scheme is obtained from the basic scheme, also presented by Boneh and Franklin (2003) , by applying the Fujisaki-Okamoto hybridisation techniques (Fujisaki and Okamoto, 1999) . Boneh and Franklin (2003) have proved that the FullIdent is secure under chosen ciphertext attack by using random oracle constructions. To prove our PBE scheme is secure, we first assume the IBE scheme is secure and then we present how to securely reduce the PBE scheme to the IBE scheme.
Theorem 1: The PBE scheme is secure and can be reduced to the IBE scheme.
Proof: We assume that the IBE scheme is secure due to the proof presented by Boneh and Franklin (2003) . To prove the proposed PBE scheme is secure, we evaluate the security due to the reduction from PBE scheme to IBE scheme. Our strategy is to prove the modifications introduced by PBE scheme will not affect the security of the original IBE scheme. To summarise, two differences exist between PBE scheme and IBE scheme:
1 In PBE scheme, Q A = [kk]P is publicly known, where k,k ∈ Z * δ P
. The private key is computed based on the masked pseudonym [k]P . To find [k]P , (in other words, to findk −1 by given P and [kk]P ), it is at least as hard as to solve ECDLP problem (see ECDLP definition in Appendix 7), which is considered to be a hard problem. Under Random Oracle model, it is proved by Boneh and Franklin (2003) that IBE scheme is chosen ciphertext attack secure, which provides no polynomially bounded algorithm having a non-negligible advantage in solving the BDH problem. Based on the above analysis, we claim that the modifications and the introduced parameters by PBE scheme will not affect the security of IBE algorithms. Thus, the PBE scheme is secure.
Lemma 1 (pseudonym anonymity): Using PBE scheme, the self-chosen pseudonym is masked by a random number k ∈ Z δ P . Both the pseudonym and its private key cannot be derived by other AUs.
Proof: The AU A possesses the pseudonym PD A = Q A , c A and it is known to other AUs. Using the PBE scheme, A uses two random numbers to determine a pseudonym, that is, k andk. In order to disclose A's pseudonym and private key, the adversary needs to know the private information k andk. Given P and Q A = [kk]P , the adversary cannot derive the value kk which is equivalent to solving the ECDLP problem (see definition in Appendix A). Given c A and Q A where
, the adversary cannot determine Q A , which is equivalent to solving pairing inversion problem (see definition in Appendix A). Since both ECDLP and pairing inversion problems are considered as hard problems, we conclude that the adversaries cannot derive the secret information of an AU by knowing his/her pseudonym.
In PBE scheme, the masker c A plays a crucial role. c A masks the real pseudonym [k]P of the AU. In this way, the receiver will be able to use the private key [sk]P to decrypt the ciphertext. In other words, the PBE scheme is a masked version of IBE scheme and it is equivalent to IBE scheme that uses the point [k]P as the public key and the point [sk]P as the private key. Since k is blind to all AUs except the pseudonym holder, even if the adversaries know the master secret s, they cannot derive the private key [sk]P .
In addition, the PBE scheme provides key privacy due to the randomly introduced value r ∈ {0, 1} n for each ciphertext. The PBE scheme preserves the key privacy due to the randomly chosen value r ∈ {0, 1} n for every ciphertext in the Encrypt algorithm. Since H 3 is a random oracle and the r is randomly chosen, the probability that a plaintext is encrypted twice by using the same value of r is 1/2 n , which is negligible. Thus, the adversaries cannot identify the encryption keys by inspecting the ciphertext.
Zero-round key exchange
In this section, we present a ZKE protocol that can be used to share a secret key (k AB ) between any pair of AUs, for example A and B. Technically, if we consider the broadcasted pseudonyms as part of the key exchange procedure, we should not call our scheme as 'ZKE'. However, we consider broadcasting pseudonyms as part of starting a natural conversation instead of part of key exchanging; thus, we still call our scheme as ZKE. Unlike traditional Diffie-Hellman type of key exchanging protocol (Menezes et al., 1997) , using ZKE, two AUs do not need to exchange key components to derive a shared secret. Based on each other's pseudonyms, a pair of AUs are able to derive a unique shared key. The ZKE protocol is presented in Table 2 . 
In Table 2 , the pseudonyms of A and B are Q A , c A and Q B , c B , respectively. The shared key k AB can be computed by simply using each other's pseudonyms and the system public key Q 0 .
Security analysis of ZKE
In Table 2 , the k AB can be derived by both A and B. Here we present the correctness of ZKE scheme.
Similarly, we can show that (ê(Q A , Q 0 )c A )
Using ZKE scheme, any two AUs can derive a unique shared key regardless of the changes of the mask value c x .
Theorem 2: Using ZKE scheme, a pairwise shared key can only be derived by the corresponding pair of pseudonym holders.
Proof: Using (2), the adversaries can computeê(
and g k A 2 , respectively, where
, and g k A 1 , the adversary cannot determine k A and k B , which is equivalent to solving Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) which is believed to be a hard problem.
Blind certificate scheme
Construction of blind certificate scheme
In this section, we present a Pseudonym-Based Signature (PBS) scheme that can be used to create blind certificates for AUs. The PBS scheme is designed based on the BLS scheme proposed by Boneh et al. (2001) and blind signature scheme proposed by Boldyreva (2003) .
It is desirable that an anonymous communication organiser who publishes the system parameter params is able to grant the admission to AUs. One way to do this is to generate certificates for the pseudonyms that are self-generated by the AUs. In this way, during the anonymous communications, a pseudonym can be validated through verifying its certificate, that is, only the pseudonym with valid certificate will be used as an encryption key during an anonymous communication session. We define the requirements of our blind certificate scheme as follows:
1 each AU can self-generate his/her pseudonym and corresponding private key 2 the blind certificate generator (i.e. the organiser) is responsible for the certificate generation and both the pseudonym and the corresponding private key are blind to the organiser.
3 the AUs cannot generate new and valid certificates based on the existing valid certificates 4 the AUs can validate a pseudonym and its corresponding certificate by using the publicly known params.
To fulfil the above requirements, we propose a four-step scheme: KeyGen, Sign, Recover, and Verify. The PBS scheme is presented as follows:
KeyGen: params = G 1 , G 3 ,ê, n, P , Q 0 , δ P , H, H 2 , H 3 , H 4 is published. The description of params is given in Table 1 (not all parameters are used in PBS scheme). The AU generates a masked point Q B = [ ]H (PD A ), where ∈ Z δ P is randomly selected and 1 ≡ −1 mod δ P . AU then sends Q B to the organiser.
Sign: the organiser computes the signature σ = [s]Q B , then sends it to the AU.
Recover: on receiving the σ , the AU recovers the signature by computing σ = [
−1 ]σ , where 1 ≡ −1 mod δ P . Thus, the σ is the signature of PD A .
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Verify: to verify the signature, the AU performs the following test:ê (H (PD A ), Q 0 ) =ê(σ, P ) . In PBS scheme, the AU generates the hash value of PD A . This will allow the AU to mask the point Q B . Thus, the organiser will not know the real pseudonym of the AU and the corresponding signature σ . Comparing with the blind signature scheme proposed by Boldyreva (2003) , PBS introduces two additional operations: the hash operation H on the pseudonym and the multiplicative masking operation of . Next, we will discuss the security and privacy analysis on these two operations.
Security and anonymity analysis of the PBS
To verify a signature, the PBS scheme tests two parings operations. To see how it works, we demonstrate the correctness of the testing operations in the Verify algorithm as follows:
Our PBS scheme is based on the BLS scheme proposed by Boneh et al. (2001) . The authors have proved that the BLS scheme is secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message attack in the random oracle model assuming CDH problem (presented in Appendix) is hard in G 1 .
Theorem 3: The PBS scheme is secure and can be reduced to the BLS scheme.
Proof: To prove the our PBS scheme is secure, we first assume that the BLS scheme is secure and then we present how to securely reduce the PBS scheme to the BLS scheme. In BLS scheme, the user's identity ID A is mapped to the point Q A = H 1 (ID A ) = [k ]P in G 1 by using a random function H 1 : {0, 1} n → G 1 . H 1 prevents the adversary from determining k by knowing the point Q A . The adversary cannot solve k , which is equivalent to solving ECDLP problem, which is a hard problem. Thus the adversary cannot forge the signature [k s]P for arbitrarily selected user identity ID A by knowing the public key [s]P . The PBS scheme introduces the random mapping (one-way) function H : G 1 × G 3 → G 1 in the Verify algorithm, in which the function H serves the same purpose of H 1 in BLS scheme. Although the adversary knows the public key [s]P and a point Q A in G 1 , he/she cannot forge the signature [s]H (Q A , c) = [sk ]P without knowing the k . Thus, the PBS scheme is another form of BLS scheme with different parameter setting and assumptions. Based on the above analysis, the PBS scheme is a modified version of BLS scheme and the PBS scheme does not change the security strength of BLS scheme. n → G 1 in BLS scheme. Instead of mapping an identity to a point in G 1 , the H first combines a point in G 1 and a value in G 3 and then maps them to a random point in G 1 . This feature will prevent the pseudonym holder from generating new valid certificates based on a known certificate. It might be noted that any bogus AU can impersonate other AUs by submitting others pseudonyms to the organiser in order to derive a valid certificate. However, the bogus AU will get no benefit from the derived certificates since he does not have the private keys of the corresponding pseudonyms. Thus, he cannot decrypt the ciphertext and derive the shared keys as we have discussed in the PBE and ZKE schemes.
We note that in BLS scheme, the H 1 {0, 1} n → G 1 is performed at the signer side and it prevents a user from generating an identity from a known point in G 1 . In PBS scheme, we use the random function H to replace H 1 and move the operation of H to the pseudonym holder side. In summary, using the blind certificate scheme, the organiser has the capability in controlling the population of the AUs in the anonymous communication system. In the next section, we will present the pseudonym revocation scheme based on our PBE, ZKE and PBS schemes.
Pseudonym revocation
We have presented an PBE scheme in Section 3. It may be noted that a simpler solution of the PBE scheme for AUs is to randomly select a number k ∈ Z δ P as the private key and uses [k]P as the AU's pseudonym. In this way, the tradition ECC encryption/decryption algorithms and key exchange algorithm can be applied. However, using this approach, it is difficult to achieve revocation in anonymous communication system since the organiser has no control on the self-generated pseudonyms. In previously presented PBE and PBS schemes, the research goal is to utilise pseudonyms to achieve anonymity in order to prevent the adversaries (including the organiser) from linking a pseudonym to an acting subject. In contrast, the proposed revocation scheme is to grant the revocation abilities to the organiser to revoke one or a set of pseudonyms from the anonymous communication system without knowing the revoked pseudonyms (however, the organiser should know the masked pseudonyms). In addition, the revocation can be issued based on the type of anonymous services or the participants' roles.
In all our following discussions, we assume the information originated from the organiser is signed by his/her private key. All AUs can verify the signature by using the his/her public key.
Service revocation
The revocation can be deployed by changing the public known params. For example, an organiser is in charge of the anonymous services within an anonymous communication system. He/she can publish (via periodically broadcasting or accessible publicly known websites) the system parameters params = G 1 , G 3 ,ê, n, P , Q 0 [i], H, H 2 , H 3 , H 4 . All AUs trust the organiser except disclosing their pseudonyms to him/her. The organiser maintains a set of system public keys Q 0 [i] = [s i ]P , where i = 1, . . . , m (m is the total number of services). If the organiser wants to revoke the service number 5 (as an illustrative example, the anonymous file downloading service is defined as the service number 5), he/she just simply excludes the Q 0 [5] in the params. Thus, all pseudonyms and their corresponding private keys derived from Q 0 [5] = [s 5 ] will be revoked (see Section 3.2 on how to generate pseudonyms and corresponding private keys). As the results, none of the anonymous service providers can use their pseudonyms to provide anonymous downloading services within the anonymous communication domain controlled by the organiser, since the service requesters will consider the system public key Q 0 [5] is revoked.
Pseudonym revocation
Each pseudonym has a unique signature, for example, e(Q A , Q 0 )c A for the pseudonym PD A = Q A , c A (as presented in Section 4, whereê(Q A , Q 0 )c A = e(P , Q 0 ) k A ). The valueê(Q A , Q 0 )c A will not be changed regardless if the AU A changes the masker c A . In order to revoke a pseudonym, the organiser can maintain a revocation list of valuesê(Q x , Q 0 ) · c x , where x represents the revoked pseudonyms. The revocation list is publicly accessible to all AUs. Note that the organiser cannot revoke a pseudonym by revoking its certificate, since the certificate is blind to the organiser. In addition, the valueê(Q A , Q 0 )c A is computed at the beginning of the PBE scheme (see Section 3). Thus, before encrypting a message, the ciphertext sender can check the revocation list in order to validate the corresponding pseudonym.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a PBE scheme, a zero-round key exchange scheme, a PBS scheme, and revocation schemes for anonymous communications. Using PBE scheme, an AU can self-generate his/her pseudonym and corresponding private key based on a set of publicly known system parameters. During the anonymous communication, a pseudonym uniquely identifies an AU and serves as his/her public key. The PBE scheme is an anonymous version of IBE scheme. For anonymous communication, the PBE scheme is more flexible and scalable since no PKG is required and it is more secure due to the self-generated private key. The proposed ZKE, PBS and pseudonym revocation schemes ensure both the accountability and the admissibility within an anonymous communication system, that is, only the pseudonym with a valid certificate is admissible to the anonymous communication system; in addition, a pseudonym can be revoked by the system organiser.
Our proposed schemes ensure both security and anonymity for AUs. Here, we present several research directions based on existing anonymous solutions. For anonymous communications, the AU will change his/her pseudonym frequently to prevent the adversaries from identifying his/her involved anonymous sessions. Thus, it is highly desired: 1 a certificate can be used for multiple pseudonyms 2 multiple non-identifiable pseudonyms map to the same private key by using the same set of system parameters 3 the changes of pseudonyms is traceable, that is, only the anonymous communication peers can trace the changes of the peer's pseudonyms (in this way, the anonymous communication peers will not lose the tracks of established anonymous communication sessions).
